

NATIONAL HISTORICAL INTELLIGENCE MUSEUM

A NOTE ON CONTENT

Making the museum a heavily historical one has many advantages. It allows us:

1. To provoke thought while interesting (even entertaining) the viewers on some very important points not well understood by many Americans. Dramatic treatments of history - historical novels, documentaries, historical or period films - have huge audiences, as do espionage novels; and nostalgia underlies the appeal of much in continuing education, entertainment and hobbies. All this points to a potentially very wide appeal for exhibits which make general points on intelligence collection, but focus around such dramatic subjects as espionage and colorful secret agents in the American Revolution, the Civil War and since; cryptographic successes, such as the Black Chamber and the Naval Treaty and ENIGMA and ULTRA, and failures (eg. Russia in World War I), aerial and satellite reconnaissance, such as in the U-2 story and the Cuba Missile Crisis; electronic listening as with the Great Seal in the Moscow Embassy, and intercepts, as with tapping the recently - developed telegraph in the Civil War, the Berlin Tunnel and the Zimmerman Telegram; types and variety of agents (eg. Philby, Wennerstrom, Col. Abel, Sorge, Rado, "Cicero") counterintelligence (eg. some of the FBI's more famous older cases, and more recent ones involving both military and civilian agencies and KGB activities more generally).
2. To address such important matters as war and peace, changes in non-democratic governments (succession questions), the impact of some revolutions on US interests, and thus to address general points about early warning analysis, estimates, dissemination, and briefings of top leaders, misconceptions and misjudgements, or failures to disseminate adequately and use available intelligence. Exhibits covering such subjects might center on Pearl Harbor; the beginnings of the Civil War; Arab-Israeli wars; the extravagant expectation of all initial participants in World War I; the wishfulness of the Japanese in World War II; the unwillingness to listen to evidence of Stalin with regard to Hitler's preparations for a massive attack on the Soviet Union, to cite a few arbitrarily chosen examples.

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3. To make some very basic points about intelligence which the knowledgeable take for granted, but are not as well understood generally as they should be. These include:
 - That espionage is an ancient and virtually universal activity.
 - That we Americans owe much to intelligence activities since the time of "George Washington, Spymaster".
 - That although virtually universal, intelligence is also a very "national" type of activity, dictatorships (and before that, absolutist monarchies) approaching it differently than democracies and with even differences among approaches to intelligence among the democracies (eg. the longtime acceptance of a British Official Secrets Act).
4. To address sometimes complex factors underlying the challenge posed by the need to make decisions which depend on an understanding of the probable intentions and likely actions of adversaries, potential adversaries and allies. These could include stereotypical thinking, adoption of important analogies - or failure to adopt them - or even naivete and overconfidence.
5. To make sometimes controversial matters (eg. civil liberties vs. requirements of national security; the role of the courts relative to intelligence, the limits of Congressional oversight; media coverage of intelligence; possible "political" use of intelligence data) clear in a relatively noncontroversial way.
6. To avoid the truly sensitive (eg. in dealing with technology and weaponry in terms of intelligence, or with cryptography).

Finally, in planning for relatively - recent content of the museum we will have to grapple with the fact that even highly - informed people sometimes tend to "define" intelligence differently. The museum's content, will require further discussion and definition. It clearly would include foreign intelligence and counterintelligence and should in our view, include such historical and interesting related activities as deception and forgeries, and escape and evasion. It might or might not, however in dealing with relatively recent events, cover to any extent a number of other subjects, such as counter-insurgency and guerilla warfare, psychological warfare and propaganda and covert political action, except insofar as such activities require good intelligence.